Saturday, 31 March 2018

A good way to test if Dr Thum is an objective historian



A good way to test whether you consider Dr Thum to be objectively fair or not is to watch the exchange between him and Minister Shanmugam with regard to the minutes of a meeting of the Barisan Sosialis on 23 September 1962.

This was one of the key documents - notes of a BS meeting taken by a mole and made available to Special Branch - which convinced Lord Selkirk in late 1962 of the need to take action against the (alleged) communists.

Minister Shanumgam says that the notes of the discussion clearly show the communist nature of the BS, and also that while they intended to adopt constitutional methods of struggle for now, they envisaged moving to an armed struggle in a few years time to (in effect) 'complete the revolution'.

Dr Thum argues that BS members were discussing ONLY the anti-colonial struggle and that the minutes did not contain any evidence of the communist control of BS.

When asked about whether the British officials (Selkirk and Moore) genuinely believed in the communist threat based on their reading of the BS meeting notes, Dr Thum at first tried to argue that the British had already decided to act and were looking for justifications, but then accepted that the British genuinely believed (based on the notes) in the communist threat.

Dr Thum wrote in his 2013 ARI paper that : "Barisan members had complained that the constitution was pointless if it was so easily manipulated, asking if there was another way forward. Selkirk "chose to interpret" these as calls to abandon constitutional action, and disregarded their unanimous agreement to keep following peaceful constitutional action. ..."

Minister Shanmugam had (earlier in the exchange) asked Dr Thum what "another way forward" meant, and particularly if it meant "armed struggle". Dr Thum refused to be drawn on what it meant, saying that it just meant some other way forward, whatever that might be. At most, he conceded that it could include armed struggle. He was also asked he he could have worded his description of Selkirk's conclusion better (i.e. in a more fair way) and he conceded that he should have worded it better.

All in all, I think Dr Thum really fell flat in his analysis of the 23 Sep 1962. His claim that the BS members were thinking only of anti-colonial action was not believable, nor does his assertion that they had unanimously decided to follow constitutional action provide a complete picture necessary to assess BS (or at least the British view of BS) - because what Dr Thum omitted is that, according to the minutes, BS had decided they had no alternative to peactful constitutional action for the time being, but were prepared to armed struggle later if necessary and anticipate it as likely. Finally, Dr Thum claims that the minutes do not show the communist nature of BS at all, where Minister Shanmugam says that evidence that this was a communist pparty is plain from the whole tenor of the discussion. I think the Hon Minister was plainly right on this.

People should listen and decide for themselves, My view is that despite the limitations of a cross-examination format, Minister Shanmugam was able to show that Dr Thum did not deal with the evidence in relation to this meeting fairly and objectively as a historian.

By Lian Chuan Yeoh
Lawyer

Operation Coldstore: Declassified British documents revealed a real communist threat in Singapore

Dr Thum has ignored several colonial dispatches and Internal Security Council (ISC) minutes that clearly showed the existence of a serious communist threat.  

Lord Selkirk, the UK Commissioner in Singapore and his deputy, Philip Moore, were concerned about the communist threat and had advocated firm action as early as 1960.  

FROM THE BRITISH ARCHIVES:

In a May 1960 ISC (Internal Security Council) meeting, Lord Selkirk:
“…expressed his appreciation of the skilful way in which the Singapore Government were trying to deal with the problem of subversion in the trade unions, but said that it was obviously necessary to keep a careful watch on any pressure building up to subvert the TUC [Trade Union Congress].”  ISC (60) Revised Minutes of 9th Meeting, 19 May 1960 (para 4)



Later, during another ISC meeting in October 1960, Selkirk commented that the Singapore Government:

“…was faced here by a challenge against the democratic system over the whole of Malaya. To a large extent this challenge was now being made through the trade unions in Singapore. The Government could not allow itself to be knocked about by the Communists acting through the trade unions. The strength of the Government's case was that these people were pressing the Communist cause by subversive methods. By sticking to its line, the Government would emerge stronger in the end. It should not, therefore, be deterred by fears of any temporary unpopularity.”  ISC (60) Revised Minutes of 14th Meeting, 7 Oct 1960 (para 8)


Whatever reservations Selkirk or his deputy Philip Moore might have had about arresting the communists, they later became fully convinced of the need for security action when more evidence emerged about communist control of the political party BarisanSosialis Singapura (BSS), the discussion BSS leaders had about the question of armed struggle, and when the BSS came out in support of the armed rebellion in Brunei.  

On 7 December 1962, a day before the outbreak of the Brunei rebellion, Moore wrote:

“I enclose copies of reports which came to us last month from a reliable and well placed source on two meetings held at the headquarters of the Barisan Sosialis last September.  These reports are of considerable importance, not only for what they reveal of the future intentions of Barisan Sosialis, but they provide more conclusive evidence than we have had hitherto for the belief that Barisan Sosialis are Communist controlled…It has never been disputed that the Communists in Singapore are following United Front tactics and that Barisan Sosialis is their principal instrument on the political front…The report on the first of the two meetings shows that those engaging in the discussion were Communists examining quite frankly how best to achieve their ends.  Furthermore, we can see that the Communist influence within Barisan Sosialis is not confined to the Central Executive Committee but extends to Branch Committee level…”. CO 1030/1160, Moore to Wallace, 7 Dec 1962 (paras 1 and 2) 


A week later, on 14 December 1962, after the Brunei rebellion, Lord Selkirk sent a dispatch to Duncan Sandys, the Secretary of State for the Colonies:

“I said I had recognised all along that a threat was presented by the communists in Singapore.  I had not however previously been convinced that a large number of arrests was necessary to counter this threat.  Recently, however, new evidence had been produced about the extent of the communist control of the Barisan Sosialis and also there had been indications that the communists might resort to violence if the opportunity occurred.  Recent statements by the Barisan Sosialis and Party Rakyatsupporting the revolt in Brunei confirmed this.  Accordingly H.M.G. [Her Majesty’s Government] were prepared to see [arrest] action taken in Singapore…”. CO 1030/1160, Selkirk to SSC, Tel. 582, 14 Dec 1962 (para 5)


Revelation from various sources - including CPM Secretary-General Chin Peng and The Plen (Fong Chong Pik) confirmed without a shadow of a doubt, the existence of a communist conspiracy and the communist united front.

CPM Secretary-General Chin Peng and the Plen (Fong Chong Pik) had revealed in their books about sabotaging PAP’s plans for merger and Malaysia.

The Plen revealed how he had used the Chinese press to disseminate his opposing views. He also revealed how he had had secret meetings in Jakarta to lead the united front in Singapore and target the PAP for subversion.

Chin Peng disclosed how DengXiaoping had ‘advised’ him in July 1961 in Beijing to continue with the armed struggle and how he accepted the ‘advice’ and Deng’s offer of financial help.

These are some facts that clearly contradict the claims by Dr Thum, that there was “no evidence” of a communist conspiracy.

Dr Thum chose to ignore revelations from many sources, including first hand CPM sources.His academic work is skewed to the story that he BELIEVED in.

He was reported in mainstream media as saying that history is “not a narrative… (but) an argument”.

He said: “You can’t go back in time and get every single perspective. You should argue for what you believe to be the right story and it is the strength of these arguments that makes for fascinating history.”

This tells us that he is not an objective historian.

Dr Thum had considered the evidence from special branch in isolation and ignored the active and robust discussions on the extent of the communist threat that also took place at that time.

He did not read books written by leading cadres and rejected the account given by none other than the chief of the Communist Party of Malaya, Chin Peng as 'unreliable'.

Dr Thum chose to ignore those pieces of evidence and writings that are inconvenient to the 'right story' that he believed in, so that he might present his story as the truth.

To argue for the right story you believe in is to write the end of the story first , and then you look for the arguments that will prop up your story and suppress all other evidence that does not.

Two things in conclusion:

Objective historians do not work that way.
Evidence pointed to a real communist threat.